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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK H. PITTS and SANDRA J · 
PITTS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 15010 
KIMBERLY B. McLACHLAN and 
CRAIG McLACHLAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
On May 13, 1977, Appellants filed a "Motion to Correct 
Record and to Strike Portions of Respondents' Brief" indicating 
that they desired to file a reply brief following disposition 
of the motion and before argument of the case before the Court. 
No request for oral argument has been made and it is believed 
that this Reply Brief is timely filed. 
The denial of the Motion to Correct Record and to 
Strike Portions of Respondents' Brief requires some comment 
on the portions of the Brief of Respondents believed to be 
improper, even though not stricken by the Court. 
We still urge Rule 75(g) that the record before this 
Court is the record as properly transmitted by the Clerk of 
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the Court, and that "the matter so certified and trans-
mitted constitutes the record on appeal." 
Rule 7 5 (p) ( 2) provides for the making of a· staterrt 
of facts and in the second paragraph gives the Respondent r 
right to set forth portions which he controverts, providin~ 
that Respondent 
"* * * shall make a statement of the facts 
as he finds them, giving reference to the 
pages of the record supporting his statement 
and controverting appellant's statement." 
Respondents in their Brief at page 2, lines 12-2b, 
and page 4, lines 13-19, recite alleged facts which are not 
part of the record on appeal and were not before the trial 
court and cannot be considered by this Court, if the rules 
and procedure for appeal mean anything. 
Respondents were free to file affidavits in opposit 
to the motion of Appellants for amendment of their summary 
judgment, and failed to do so. Had such affidavits been 
filed, the attempted allegations could have been dealt wito, 
If this Court were a fact-finding body, and if the allegatic 
involved material facts, it would be reasonable to respond 
to the matters referred to from pages 2 and 4 of Responden~ 
Brief. Appellants assert that none of these matters was 
before the trial court and Appellants do not stipulate that 
the statements referred to at pages 2 and 4 are factual 01 
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may properly be considered by this Court. 
At page 5 of their Brief, Respondents speculate in 
lines 17-24 as to what the trial court might have considered. 
Appellants suggest that the trial court did not have the file 
before it, might have formed a hasty opinion that the motion 
of Appellants should be hastily disposed of, and thereafter 
did not follow the arguments o'f counsel. In support of this, 
Appellants reason that had the trial court listened attentively 
to the arguments and examined the file in detail, it could 
not have made the ruling it did. 
At page 5 of their Brief, Respondents speculate again 
that if the relief Appellants seek were granted, there would 
be done to the Respondents "a gross injustice" (line 4). If 
the Court will examine this statement carefully, it will 
appear that it is predicated upon the proposition that taking 
something from the Appellants is not an injustice and that 
giving to the creditors of Respondents and to the Respondents 
a great benefit at the expense of the Appellants is not an_ 
injustice, but to deprive the Respondents and their creditors 
of that windfall would be "a gross injustice". The argument 
is further bottomed upon the supposition that the execution 
sale would not bring a fair price for the property. If-
Respondents were interested in protecting the property, they 
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would guarantee a fair price. There is no indication any 
place in this record that Appellants are attempting to do 
anything except be paid for the property which they ·sold 
under contract. 
ONE NEW ISSUE 
Although not properly a part of the Reply Brief, 
Appellants beg leave to introduce a new issue and a new 
point which subsequent research has brought to their attenti 
Appellants concede that Respondents should have the right to 
file a responsive brief as to this point. 
The original Brief of Appellants allows the positic 
that the obtaining of a judgment was a performance of the 
contract of sale and that title to the property passed to 
someone and that the vendor's lien was thereby destroyed. 
Appellants do not concede this to be the established law. 
There is authority that the theory is not "perforo: 
of the contract" but a question of whether the judgment 
effectuates a merger of the cause of action into the judgJre:· 
There is also a corolla.ry that rights existing or causes of 
action existing and not necessarily involved in the grantini 
of the judgment persist, and further, that to meet the 
requirements of justice, the merger will have such limited 
effect as is compelled. 
This doctrine is summarized in 46 Am.Jur.2d, ~ 
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II II 390 and 393. For instance, in Paragraph 393 appears 
this statement: 
."The general rule is that a lien securing a 
debt which becomes merged in a judgment is 
not affected by such merger. If a debt is 
of such a character that a lien is given by 
common law or statute, the merger of the 
judgment does not involve a merger of the 
lien, and the latter may continue until the 
debt is satisfied." 
Am.Jur.2d cites, among other cases, Adams v. Davies, 
107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d 207, 159 ALR 852. 
The Adams case deals with a question of a merger of 
one judgment into a later judgment but discusses the more 
general rule of merger, and at page 210 of 156 P.2d, cites 
from other cases the following: 
and 
"The doctrine [of merger] will be applied 
only when the ends of justice will be thereby 
subserved." 
"It is also the law that merger is largely a 
question of.intention and to a great extent 
depending on the circumstances surrounding 
each particular case and that the courts will 
always presume against it whenever it will 
operate to the disadvantage of a party." 
and again 
"The rule is, however, that where the··ends of. 
justice require the judgment does not annihilate 
the debt, and that the doctrine of merger will 
be carried no further than the ends·of·justice-
demand." 
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and again 
"It will not be there applied to destroy the 
security of a decree as a lien to the defeat 
of justice." · 
And then this Court, again on page 210 of 156 P.2d, in 
conunenting on Batten v. Lauther, 74 W.Va. 167, 81 s.E. 8ll, 
823, said: 
"It was also said there that the first judgment 
would not be extinguished unless actually satis-
fied. To sununarize the rules applied to the 
merger doctrine: The lesser security is absorbed 
by the greater security, as the cause of action 
by the judgment; the rule of merger is not 
inflexible and will be applied only when Ue 
ends of justice require; when such result is 
not in keeping with justice, the merger doctrine 
will not be allowed to impair the security of 
judgments as liens. Merger is the absorption 
of a thing of less importance by a greater wherebj 
the lesser ceases to exist but the greater is not 
increased; as to whether there is a merger ~y 
depend to a great extent upon intention and the 
circumstances of each particular case--the first 
judgment being a right and property of the 
creditor, it cannot be merge9- in a second judgment 
against his will or over his objection, in the 
absence of strong equitable reasons therefor; 
* * *." Pages 210-211. 
This limitation on the doctrine of merger applies 
a further and forceful reason for permitting justice to be 
done in this case by avoiding a windfall to Respondents and 
doing equity to the Appellants. Their property should not~ 
taken from them without the payment agreed to in the central: 
The vendor's lien should not be merged into the judgment and 
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hence into the Sheriff's deed until the debt has been paid. 
Re~J.~. 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants was served 
on the Respondents this lOth day of June, 1977, by mailing 
true and correct copies thereof, postage prepaid, to David M. 
Bown and Stephen R. McCaughey, attorneys for Respondents, 321 
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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